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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Letting Go of Territorial 
Integrity: Getting Realism 
and Ideals Right on 
Ukraine
In my previous two posts (here and here), I looked at the 
problems of declaring Russia’s actions in Ukraine illegal – the 
dark side of law’s polycentrism. In this post, I consider the 
defective legal policy driving the Western response to Russia’s 
intervention in Ukraine – the West’s failed fixation on 
territorial integrity – and consider a better response to 
Ukraine’s contested future: the return of a repressed idealism.
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Western responses to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine look 
like an exercise in realism. Constrained by imperial 
overstretch and economic entanglement with Russian fossil 
fuel, the US and Europe know they are unable and unwilling 
to force a newly assertive Russia to withdraw militarily from 
the Crimea. So instead they are fighting a preemptive battle: 
In all the diplomacy – a NATO summit, talks in Geneva – 
there has been almost no talk of returning Crimea, and all 
the pressure of sanctions is aimed at forestalling further 
Russian incursions into the mixed areas of eastern Ukraine.
But the realism is grudging. Western policy is equally 
marked and driven by a curious – and curiously misplaced – 
idealism: a fetishism of territorial integrity, which defeats 
our own interests and denies a different idealism that once 
motivated our law and policy.
I. No Questions Please
Russia’s actions have shocked the world, but no one could 
have been shocked by the specter of Crimean secession. 
Given the region’s demography, history, and the autonomist 
sentiments of its population, there has long been every 
reason to expect that, given a choice, Crimeans might 
willingly join Russia. Of course, the recent referendum didn’t 
offer them a real choice: It allowed voters to opt for radical 
autonomy or Russia, but not the status quo – all under the 
coercive presence of Russian occupation. There almost 
certainly was and is a genuine majority for independence, 
but it was impossible to know.
Real choice was never on Moscow’s agenda – the 
referendum was a triumphant confirmation, not a decision. 
But the US and Europe were no more interested in a genuine 
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vote than Moscow was: The Obama administration ruled out 
recognizing the referendum before the Russians had a 
chance to rig the vote. Although conceding secessionist 
sentiment there was genuine, Western policymakers left no 
space for a Crimean referendum on any terms, and has 
taken the same line in eastern Ukraine.
II. Surrender or the Gun
The reason, of course, is opposition to Russia’s improper 
military incursion. America and Europe have many geo-
strategic interests in the crisis – energy security; protection 
of the global economy; a stable relationship with Russia; and 
absorption of Ukraine into the Western orbit – but one 
involves a principle of the global legal order: reaffirming the 
shaken consensus that borders may only be changed by 
peaceful means.
Yet to vindicate this consensus, the US and its European 
allies have chosen to stand their ground on a strangely 
hollow principle: The Obama administration’s first response 
to the crisis was to declare its support Ukraine’s territorial 
integrity, and it has continued on that path. On Crimea, it 
has sunk into a tactical silence, but defense of territorial 
integrity continues to drive Western rhetoric and policy for 
the rest of Ukraine, determining the schedule of threats and 
sanctions.
Western diplomats have advised the new Kiev government 
to appease its Russian minority – but by internal means only. 
This can project an aura of unreality, as with the American 
proposal, early in the crisis, to send monitors to Crimea to 
protect the rights of Russians, when of course it’s all the 
non-Russians there who need protecting. But such logic 
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arises out of seeing Ukraine as the necessary territorial 
frame: secession is unthinkable, while Russia’s proposals to 
federalize Ukraine – assumed to be a way station to 
secession – are met with instant, oppositional skepticism: 
the false urgency of ‘no.’
Ukraine’s government and the newly elected president, 
Poroshenko, swith the full support of their Western allies, 
insist solutions must be found within Ukraine’s existing 
constitutional framework, but the constitution prohibits 
regional referenda precisely to avoid the kinds of changes 
most Crimeans and some eastern Ukrainians so clearly want. 
And although the new government has proposed dialogue 
with the separatists, there’s no evidence it is considering 
changes to the constitution that would allow deliberation on 
secession – changes that would be even less likely if Kiev’s 
military effort succeed in its double task of suppressing the 
separatists while avoiding Russian intervention.
The result is a set of empty boxes, a choice less real than the 
Crimean referendum: A vote under Russian occupation or 
separatist militant pressure would be illegitimate, but under 
restored Ukrainian sovereignty a vote would be illegal. For 
those Ukrainians who genuinely desire a new regime, that is 
a policy of surrender or the gun. And as long as Russia 
supplies the latter, they don’t need to contemplate the 
former. So much for realism.
III. Proxies for Principles
Opposing Russia’s intervention has thus also meant opposing 
the secessionist desires of many Ukrainians. But surely this 
is the right thing to do? At first glance, it might appear that 
territorial integrity is simply the mirror of non-aggression, 
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the perfect expression of the very principle we want to 
reaffirm. And self-determination law is a right of ‘peoples,’ 
which in contemporary international law means the whole 
population of a state, not just some splintered fraction of it.
But territorial integrity is not a principle, it is a proxy: It 
makes no sense to defend the territorial integrity of states 
that lack the very qualities that make them worth defending 
– states whose own populations do not respect or desire the 
borders in which they live. It makes no sense to treat a 
population as a people just because it happens to be 
confined in a set of borders if that denies the real diversity, 
disagreement and desires of the actual existing people 
within that state.
Affirming the norm that borders must not be changed by 
force doesn’t mean just preventing invasions; it means 
providing pathways for peaceful change. That requires 
engagement with the causes (or pretexts) driving separatism 
and invasion. This is the logic that has driven the R2P 
movement’s turn to pre-conflict assistance, but that logic 
needs to go further: It also means supporting changes to 
borders not only in response to great persecution, but when 
that is some human community’s democratic desire.
But fixating on territorial integrity – and on Russia’s 
improper intervention – makes us miss that opportunity and 
imperative. John Kerry’s predecessor as Secretary of State, 
Hillary Clinton, recently made a stir when she compared 
Putin to Hitler. There’s something to it, because – much like 
the Munich Compromise over Sudetenland in 1938 – 
Crimea’s secession may actually be a good idea regrettably 
executed: an idea whose evident moral value we can’t see 
because its chief supporter is behaving so badly.
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We have confused resistance to Russia’s improper invasion 
with resistance to the underlying idea the invasion 
incidentally vindicated. This was the wrong way to hold a 
referendum – but that doesn’t mean holding a referendum is 
wrong. Means and ends: The principle we ought to be 
defending is the inviolability of states from outside
intervention, except in limited circumstances that Russia 
clearly hasn’t met. But we should not be defending states 
against their own people’s wishes – whether the whole 
population, or some discrete part that wants to go another 
way.
IV. Rediscovering Wilson
Today, a free vote in Crimea or eastern Ukraine is impossible 
– so we should create conditions in which a free vote is
possible. The US and Europe should press Ukraine to adopt a 
constitution that reaffirms its sovereignty and provides for 
internationally supervised plebiscites in Crimea and the east, 
say in six months; then support the process and promise to 
respect any free and fair outcome. They should condemn 
Russia’s aggression and cooperate with Russia in creating a 
legitimate pathway to achieve its strategic aspirations in 
ways the international system allows, even if that leads to 
revision of Ukraine’s borders.
As the price of cooperation, the West should insist on 
specific protections for Crimea’s Tatars, who suffered 
unspeakably under Soviet rule and fear a return to Moscow’s 
control, as well as ethnic Ukrainians, and demand 
guarantees that in eastern Ukraine – where genuine 
secessionist sentiment is much more complex – Russia will 
respect its people’s, or peoples’, wishes.
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We should demand that of Russia – and ourselves. The 
West’s interests and its ideals, properly considered, are not 
in conflict here: Our real interest is in a Ukraine secure and 
sovereign, with borders that are sensible, defensible and 
respected; our real ideal is a Ukraine in whatever borders its 
people, living in the shaping wake of their own history, 
desire. After all, that desire is our own – a thoroughly 
American idea which forged modern Europe: It is Woodrow 
Wilson’s self-determination. In the days and months ahead, 
we should ask ourselves why, instead of that democratic, 
liberating principle, it is its opposite – territorial integrity for 
its own sake – that we have chosen to defend.
The author, a professor of law at Indiana University, Associate 
Director of its Center for Constitutional Democracy, and 
member of its Russian and East European Institute, was a 
2012-13 Alexander von Humboldt Experienced Research Fellow 
in residence at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law and International Law. He is most recently editor 
of The Milošević Trial – An Autopsy (Oxford University Press 
2013), and is writing a book on secession and self-
determination.
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2 Comments
THEODOR SCHILLING
17 June, 2014 at 16:58 — Reply
I sympathise with Waters’ critique of uti possidetis which 
too often has lead to arbitrary results. However, the 
remedy that he proposes might be worse than the ill it is 
intended to heal. Uti possidetis does not prevent peoples 
from consensually separating: the divorce of the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia is a case in point. But this is not 
what Waters proposes, nor is his proposal restricted to 
what has been dubbed remedial secession. Rather, he 
proposes “supporting changes to borders … when that is 
some human community’s democratic desire”. “[W]e 
should not be defending States against their own people’s 
wishes – whether the whole population, or some discreet 
part that wants to go another way.”
This strikes me as rather facile. It does not contemplate 
that the wishes of the whole population and of any 
discreet part of it might be irreconcilable although 
Waters clearly prefers, at least for Ukraine, the wishes of 
the “discreet part”. It does not address the wishes of 
possible discreet minorities within those “discreet parts” 
– may they claim a sub-secession? Neither does it 
address the all-decisive question of the delimitation of 
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the “discreet parts” – “Crimea and the east” is not 
particularly specific. Most certainly, the question 
“whatever borders [Ukraine’s] people … desire“ will not 
get the same answer from every person interviewed. 
Equally certainly, whatever those borders will be, they 
will not be defensible, neither in the West nor, more 
practically important, in the East; this is a question of 
geography.
Finally, Woodrow Wilson. Whether self-determination is 
“a thoroughly American idea” may be doubted by anybody 
contemplating the American civil war. That that idea 
forged modern Europe is also doubtful. Its application 
after WWI was tinged with a heavy dose of the much 
older idea of vae victis, and thus laid the groundwork for 
WWII. Modern Europe was rather forged in Yalta and 
Potsdam, and self-determination did not play any role at 
that stage. In the end, John Rawls (The Law of Peoples, 
1999, at 39) has said it all: “It does not follow from the fact 
that boundaries are historically arbitrary that their role in 
the Law of Peoples cannot be justified. On the contrary, 
to fix on their arbitrariness is to fix on the wrong thing. In 
the absence of a world-state, their must be boundaries of 
some kind, which when viewed in isolation will seem 
arbitrary, and depend to some degree on historical 
circumstances.”
TIMOTHY WATERS
3 July, 2014 at 06:59 — Reply
A Reply to Prof. Schilling
‘Facile’ is an easy epithet. Posts are brief by nature, 
with important issues inevitably left in the ether. 
Prof. Schilling’s questions are excellent, and a 
moment’s reflection would suggest they have 
answers.
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First, his critiques:
1. Any question about Ukraine’s borders “will not 
get the same answer from every person 
interviewed.” True, in every election. (Scotland’s 
upcoming referendum is by majority vote.)
2. The post-World War I settlement was marked by 
vae victis – and by self-determination. One cannot 
look at a map of Mitteleuropa today and fail to see 
the effects of both. (But consider my post revised 
to ‘forged in significant part,’ with my thanks.)
3. True, self-determination is not an exclusively 
American idea. But Wilson’s model is no less 
American because the Civil War preceded it. To 
paraphrase a thoroughly American poet, my 
country contains multitudes.
4. Some borders are more easily defended; events 
show Ukraine’s eastern frontier is not one of them. 
What makes a border defensible is not geography 
but the neighbors.
5. Lastly, Rawls has certainly not said it all, or 
much of relevance here, since I nowhere suggest 
historical borders cannot be justified. But they 
need to be, and no sensible system this side of 
Panglossia supposes the ones we have are the best 
of all possible. One thing Rawls says is true: In the 
absence of a world state, there must be borders – 
so it is of the highest importance to make good 
ones.
Now, to answer Prof. Schilling’s questions:
– A referendum will never achieve total unanimity 
– and does not need to. (My model requires a 
supermajority, to assure secession is truly the 
dominant sentiment.)
– Territory is never specific – and therefore 
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requires some mechanism to delimit it. (My model 
proposes internationalized plebiscites. Such things 
were done after WWI.)
– New minorities might sub-secede – so we need 
contingent voting zones, as on the German-Polish 
and Austrian-Yugoslav borders. (I propose 
minimum populations for all seceding groups.)
– Remedial secession fails to address many cases 
and creates perverse incentives for groups to 
demonstrate a sufficient level of suffering. (My 
model proposes a right to negotiate secession.)
My proposal is complicated – like the world we live 
in. The current rule exhibits a curious indifference 
to change or desire. Its rigidity makes it easy to 
predict – Thomas Franck called it an idiot rule – 
though I don’t see that as a virtue.
Finally, the medium: The short form requires a 
reader to read for what it is. I doubt blogs are the 
right forum for developing scholarship; I feel even 
more dubious about comments. So – having in 
mind G.B. Shaw’s comment about writing that fills 
much needed gaps – I bring this one to a close.
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